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ABSTRACT 
Participatory Sensing combines the ubiquity of mobile phones 
with the sensing capabilities of Wireless Sensor Networks. It 
targets the pervasive collection of information, e.g., temper-
ature, trame conditions, or medical data. Users produce 
measurements from their mobile devices, thus, a number of 
privacy concerns - due to the personal information conveyed 
by reports - may hinder the large-scale deployment of par-
ticipatory sensing applications. Prior work has attempted 
to protect privacy in participatory sensing, but it relied 
on unrealistic assumptions and achieved no provably-secure 
guarantees. In this paper, we introduce PEPSI: Privacy-
Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure. We explore 
realistic architectural assumptions and a minimal set of for-
mal requirements aiming at protecting privacy of both data 
producers and consumers. We also present an instantiation 
that attains privacy guarantees with provable security at 
very low additional computational cost and almost no extra 
communication overhead. Finally, we highlight some prob-
lems that cali for further research in this developing área. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General— 
Security and Protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: 
Public Policy Issues—Privacy 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Security 
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1. PRELUDE 
Participatory sensing is an emerging paradigm that tar-
gets the seamless collection of data from a large number 
of user-carried devices. By embedding a sensor to a mobile 
phone, participatory sensing (also called opportunistic or ur-
ban sensing) enables harvesting dynamic information about 
environmental trends, such as ambient air quality [21], urban 
trafflc patterns [20], health-related information [15], parking 
availabilities [19], sound events [16], etc. To allow large-scale 
deployment, researchers are proposing platforms for appli-
cation developers [7] and devising innovative business mod-
els, based on incentive mechanisms for the capitalization on 
sensed data [14]. 
Participatory sensing combines the ubiquity of mobile phones 
with sensing capabilities typical of Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs). However, it differs in several aspeets. Sensors are 
high-end devices, such as smartphones, with much greater 
resources than traditional WSN sensors. Their batteries can 
be easily recharged and production cost constraints are not 
as tight. They are extremely mobile, as they leverage the 
ambulation of their carriers. Moreover, in traditional WSNs, 
the network operator is assumed to own and query all sen-
sors, while this assumption does not apply to most participa-
tory sensing scenarios. Indeed, mobile devices are tasked to 
particípate into gathering and sharing local knowledge; thus, 
different entities co-exist and might not trust each other. 
A typical participatory sensing infrastructure involves (at 
least) the following parties: 
• Sensors: Installed on smartphones or other wireless-
enabled devices, they emit data reports and form the 
basis of the participatory sensing infrastructure. 
• Carriers: Usually envisioned as the people carrying 
their smartphones, they could also be vehicles, animáis 
or any other entity carrying the mobile sensing device. 
In the rest of the paper, we refer to a sensor and its 
carrier as a Mobile Node. 
• Network Operators: They manage the network used 
to collect and deliver reports, e.g., maintaining WiFi, 
GSM, or 3G network infrastructure. 
• Queriers: They subscribe to specific information col-
lected in a participatory sensing application (e.g., "tem-
perature readings in Irvine, CA") and obtain corre-
sponding data reports. 
Motivation. The number and the heterogeneity of enti-
ties involved in participatory sensing prompts a range of new 
challenges. Unlike in WSNs, sensing devices are not "dull" 
gadgets, owned by the network operator; they are personal 
devices that follow users at all time, and their reports often 
expose personal information. Thus, not only traditional se-
curity but also privacy issues must be taken into account, as 
concerns on personal information disclosure may constitute 
a fundamental obstacle to large-scale deployment. 
Contributions. Prior work has focused on privacy issues 
in participatory sensing and proposed a few solutions that, 
however, introduce unrealistic assumptions and provide no 
provable guarantees. On the contrary, we aim at a cryp-
tographic treatment of privacy protection in participatory 
sensing. 
We investígate realistic architectural assumptions and a 
minimal set of formal privacy definitions, intended to pro-
tect privacy of both data producers (i.e., mobile nodes) and 
data consumers (i.e., queriers). Finally, we provide an in-
stantiation that attains privacy guarantees with provable se-
curity, at very low additional computational cost and almost 
no extra communication overhead. 
Organization. The next section reviews previous privacy-
enhancing solutions and highlights their limitations. Sec-
tion 3 presents the PEPSI infrastructure and its privacy re-
quirements, while Section 4 yields an efncient instantiation 
with provable security. Section 5 concludes the paper with 
a list of open problems. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In the last years, research interest in participatory sensing 
has ramped-up. Many researchers have highlighted security 
and privacy challenges [24], [13], [5], but without proposing 
actual solutions. Recent proposals in [6] and [12] are—to the 
best of our knowledge—the only results to address privacy-
related problems, henee, they are most related to our work. 
They aim at protecting anonymity of users, using Mix Net-
work techniques [4], and provide either fc-anonymity [25] or 
/-diversity [18]. They rely on statistical methods to pro-
tect privacy and do not achieve provably-secure guarantees. 
Both proposals only provide limited confidentiality, as re-
ports are encrypted under the publie key of a Report Service 
(RS), a trusted party responsible for collecting reports and 
distributing them to queriers. That is, the RS learns both 
sensors' reports and queriers' interests. 
Additional research work focuses on somewhat related 
problems. [3] argües that privacy issues can be addressed if 
each user has access to a prívate server and uses it as a proxy 
between her sensors and the application requesting her data. 
However, given the number of contributors in a participa-
tory sensing application, the requirement of per-user prox-
ies would severely limit the feasibility of this approach. [23] 
studies privacy-preserving data aggregation, e.g., computa-
tion of sum, average, variance, etc. Similarly, [10] presents a 
solution for community statistics on time-series data while 
protecting anonymity (using data perturbation in a closed 
community with a known empirical data distribution). Other 
proposals, such as [9] and [11], aim at guaranteeing integrity 
and authenticity of user-generated contents by employing 
Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs). 
2.1 Limitations of prior work 
We now discuss in detail limitations and open problems of 
prior work on security and privacy in participatory sensing. 
Assuming an ubiquitous WiFi infrastructure. One 
common feature of existing proposals is the assumption of an 
ubiquitous WiFi infrastructure used to collect and deliver re-
ports [6, 12, 23]. In particular, [6, 12] use standard MAC-IP 
address reeyeling techniques to guarantee user unlinkability 
between reports with respect to WiFi access points. Such an 
assumption imposes severe limitations on the scope of par-
ticipatory sensing applications, as an ubiquitous presence of 
open WiFi networks is not realistic today ñor anticipated in 
the next future. 
Actually, the majority of existing participatory sensing 
applications opérate from smartphones and use the cellular 
network to upload reports [22, 21, 19]. Thus, one cannot 
use WiFi-based anonymization techniques and, in partic-
ular, cannot leverage MAC-IP address reeyeling to guar-
antee unlinkability. In cellular networks, devices are iden-
tified through their International Mobile Subscriber Iden-
tity (IMSI), and ID reeyeling—besides being impossible with 
current technologies—would lead to denial of service (e.g., 
the device would not receive incoming calis for its original 
ID). Thus, it seems not possible to protect privacy of user 
locations with respect to the network operator. In fact, 
the regular usage of cellular networks (e.g., including in-
coming/outgoing phone calis), as well as heartbeat messages 
exchanged with the network infrastructure, irremediably re-
veal device's location to the operator. 
Using Mix Networks. Another limitation of prior work, 
such as [6], concerns the use of Mix Networks [4] - anonymiz-
ing channels used to de-link reports submitted by sensors 
before they reach the applications. In other words, Mix 
Networks act as proxies to forward user reports only when 
some system-defined criteria are met. Several metrics, such 
as fc-anonymity [25] or /-diversity [18] have been defined to 
characterize privacy through Mix Networks. Observe that a 
Mix Network may wait to receive fc reports before forward-
ing them to the application, e.g., to guarantee fc-anonymity. 
However, the anonymity level directly depends on the num-
ber of reports received and "mixed" by the Mix Network. 
They rely on statistical methods to protect privacy and 
do not guarantee provably-secure privacy. Moreover, there 
could be scenarios where a relatively long time could pass be-
fore the desired level of anonymity is reached (when "enough" 
reports have been collected). As a result, Mix Networks may 
remarkably decrease system throughput and cannot be used 
in settings where timely reports are required. 
Múltiple Semi-Trusted Parties. Available techniques 
to protect privacy in participatory sensing often involve many 
semi-trusted independent parties, that are always assumed 
not to coilude. The solutions in [6, 12], besides Mobile 
Nodes, Registration Authority, and WiFi Access Points, also 
assumes the presence and the non-collusion of a Task Ser-
vice (used to distribute tasks to users), a Report Service 
(to receive reports from sensors), and several Mix Network 
nodes (i.e., a trusted anonymizing infrastructure). It is not 
clear how to deploy the Task and the Report services as two 
sepárate entities having no incentive to coilude. Whereas, 
we aim at minimizing the number of needed semi-trusted 
parties (and, in general, the number of involved entities), 
and propose a participatory sensing infrastructure that can 
be deployed with formal privacy guarantees. 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we formalize: (i) the entities involved in 
a privacy-enhanced participatory sensing infrastructure, (ii) 
involved operations, and (iii) privacy requirements. 
3.1 Infrastructure 
We envision a participatory sensing infrastructure com-
posed by the following entities: 
M N s 
M N s 
Figure 1: Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure: Mobile Nodes (MNs) register to the Reg-
istration Authority (RA) and, subsequently, report sensed data to a Service Provider (SP) . Queriers, after 
registering to RA, subscribe to queries offered by the SP and receive corresponding reports. 
Mobile Nodes (MNs) . They are computing devices 
with sensing capabilities (i.e., equipped with one or more 
sensors) and with access to a cellular network. They are 
carried by people or attached to mobile entities. We assume 
that MNs run on smartphones and that users voluntarily en-
gage into participatory sensing. We denote with Ai a generic 
mobile node of a participatory sensing application. 
Queriers. Queriers are end-users interested in receiving 
sensor reports in a given participatory sensing application. 
A generic querier is denoted with Q. 
Network Operator (NO). The Network Operator is re-
sponsible for the communication infrastructure. We assume 
that the NO maintains, and provides access to, a cellular 
network infrastructure (e.g., GSM or 3G). 
Registration Authority (RA). The Registration Au-
thority handles the application setup, as well as the reg-
istration of participating parties. In our solutions, the RA 
also contributes to privacy protection, by generating crypto-
graphic public parameters, handling the registration of MNs, 
and managing queriers' subscription. 
Service Providers (SP) . The Service Provider acts as 
an intermediary between the nodes reporting readings and 
queriers subscribed to them. We envision one or more SPs 
running participatory sensing applications that offer differ-
ent query types. (For example, a national service provider 
might run a pollution monitoring application and define 
queries to retrieve reports of pollution levéis in different 
cities). Service provider's duties may include listing avail-
able sensing services, micropayment, data collection, and 
notification to queriers. 
3.2 Operatíons 
We now describe the common operatíons performed within 
participatory sensing applications. 
Setup. In this phase, the RA generates all public param-
eters and its own secret key. 
M N Registration. Users register their sensor-equipped 
device to the RA and install participatory sensing software. 
Query Registration. Queriers approach the appropri-
ate RA and request an authorization to query the partici-
patory sensing application to obtain a specific type of data 
reports, e.g., "Pollution level in Madrid, Spain". (A public 
list of available sensing services and query syntax may be 
available from the SP or the RA). Next, they may subscribe 
to one or more queries, by submitting a request to the SP 
and awaiting for the responses containing the desired read-
ings. Ideally, only queriers authorized by the RA should re-
ceive the desired reports. Also, no information about query 
interests should be revealed to the SP. 
Data Report. MNs report to the SP their readings, us-
ing the network access provided by the NO. Ideally, this 
operation should not reveal to the SP, the NO, or unautho-
rized queriers any information about reported data, such as 
type of reading (e.g., pollution) or quantitative information 
(e.g., 35rng/rn3 carbón oxide). Also, the SP and any querier 
should not learn the identity of the source MN. 
Query Execution. With this operation, the SP matches 
incoming data reports with query subscriptions. Ideally, this 
should be done blindly, i.e., the SP should learn nothing 
beyond the occurrence of an (unspecified) match, if any. 
In Figure 1, we ¡Ilústrate our participatory sensing infras-
tructure. In the depicted scenario, one may envision that a 
phone manufacturer (e.g., Nokia) acts as the RA and em-
beds a given type of sensor (e.g., air pollution meter) in one 
or more of its phone models, operated by smartphone users, 
i.e., the MNs. A service provider (such as Google, Microsoft, 
Yahoo, or a non-profit/academic organization) offers partic-
ipatory sensing applications (used, for instance, to report 
and access pollution data), and acts as an intermediary be-
tween queriers and mobile nodes. Finally, queriers are users 
or organizations (e.g., bikers) interested in obtaining read-
ings (e.g., pollution levéis). 
Observe that—similar to related work—we do not address 
the problem of encouraging mobile phone users to run par-
ticipatory sensing applications, ñor we focus on business in-
centives for phone manufacturers or for service providers. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to envision that queriers are 
willing to pay small fees (or receive advertisement) in return 
to obtaining measurements of interest. 
3.3 Privacy Requirements 
Before entering the details of our privacy requirements, 
observe that the main purpose of a participatory sensing ap-
plication is to allow queriers to obtain MNs reports. While 
our main goal is to protect the privacy of both data produc-
ers and consumere, entities registered as a querier should still 
be able to subscribe to a query and receive desired measure-
ments, thus, techniques to identify legitímate parties before 
registering them are beyond the scope of our work. 
We now define the requirements of a Privacy-Enhanced 
Participatory Sensing Infrastructure (PEPSI). Our defini-
tions are concise due to space limitation, whereas, adversar-
ial games can be found in paper's full versión [8]. 
Soundness. We say that PEPSI is sound if, upon sub-
scribing to a query, a querier in possession of the appropriate 
authorization obtains the desired readings (if any). 
Node Privacy. We say that PEPSI is node-private if nei-
ther the NO, the SP, ñor any unauthorized querier, learn any 
information about the type of reading or the data reported 
by the MN. Also, other mobile nodes should not learn any 
information about a given node's reports. In other words, 
only queriers in possession of the corresponding authoriza-
tion obtain MN's readings. 
Query Privacy. We say that a PEPSI is query-private 
if neither the NO, the SP, ñor any mobile node or any other 
querier, learn any information about the query subscribed by 
a querier. We leave as part of future work how to guarantee 
query privacy also w.r.t. the RA. 
Report Unlinkability. Report unlinkability prevenís 
any party from linking two or more reports as originating 
from a given mobile node. PEPSI provides report unlinka-
bility if different reports originating by the same MN cannot 
be linked to the source by the RA, the SP, the queriers or 
any other MN1. 
As discussed earlier, it seems unlikely to provide node lo-
cation privacy w.r.t. NO, as the NO knows phone's position 
at any time. We still consider node location privacy as for 
the RA, the SP, or unauthorized queriers. 
4. PEPSI 
We now present our PEPSI instantiation, in accordance 
with the architectural design in Figure 1 and that complies 
with privacy definitions of Section 3.3. We also discuss argu-
ments of its provable security and estímate its performance. 
4.1 PEPSI Instantiation 
In PEPSI, data reports are always labeled using keywords 
that identify the nature of the information announced by 
mobile nodes. Similarly, queriers subscribe to given queries 
by specifying the corresponding keywords. In the rest of 
the paper, we use the term identifier, and the notation ID 
(or ID*) to identify the data report/query type. Exam-
ples of such identifiers include: " Temperature in Irvine, CA" 
or "Pollution in Madrid, Spain". The list of identifiers - de-
pending on the application - can be obtained either from the 
SP or the RA. In particular, the RA defines which services 
(i.e., queries) will be available for mobile nodes to contribute 
and for users to query. However, as these identifiers can be 
public, they can be downloaded from the SP or any bulletin 
board. For ease of presentation, in the rest of the paper, we 
assume that query identifiers are available at the RA. 
Observe that we cannot guarantee user anonymity and report 
unlinkability with respect to the NO, thus, we do not consider 
the NO in our definition. 
4.1.1 High Level Description 
PEPSI works as follows. The RA runs the Setup algo-
rithm to genérate public parameters and secret keys. In 
order to pose a query, e.g., identified by ID, queriers first 
need to register to the RA and obtain the corresponding 
authorization {Query Authorization). Then, they subscribe 
their queries to the SP {Query Subscription): in PEPSI, this 
process reveáis nothing about queriers' interests. 
At the same time, before starting reporting data, MNs 
need to authenticate to the RA, and obtain: (i) the identifier 
ID corresponding to the type of their reports, and (ii) a 
token that allows them to announce data (MN Registration). 
The on-line part of PEPSI includes two operations: Data 
Report and Query Execution. With the former, MNs upload 
encrypted reports to the SP. In the latter, the SP blindly 
matches received reports with queries and forwards (match-
ing) reports to all subscribed queriers. Only authorized 
queriers obtain query responses, can decrypt data reports, 
and retrieve original measurements. Finally, we let the RA 
run a Nonce Renewal procedure to evict malicious MNs from 
the participatory sensing application. This procedure is run 
periodically and the new nonce is securely delivered to hon-
est MNs using broadcast encryption [2]. 
Our main cryptographic building block is Identity-Based 
Encryption (IBE), specifically, the construction in [1]. The 
main advantage in using IBE, as opposed to standard public -
key cryptography, is to enable non-interactivity in our query 
protocol design. This is crucial in participatory sensing sce-
narios, where MNs and queriers have no direct communica-
tion ñor mutual knowledge. 
4.1.2 Algorithms Specification 
Setup. The Registration Authority, given a security pa-
rameter A, generates a prime q, two groups Gi, G2 of order 
q, a bilinear map e : Gi x Gi —> G2.2 Next, a random s € Z*. 
and a random generator P e d , are chosen; Q is set such 
that Q = Ps. (P,Q) are public parameters. s is RA's prí-
vate master key. Also, a nonce z € Z*, is selected and R 
is set such that R = Pz. Finally, three cryptographic hash 
function, Hx : {0,1}* - • Gi, H2 : {0,1}G2 - • { 0 , 1 } \ and 
H3 : {0,1}G2 -> {0,1}A are chosen. 
MN Registration. The MN registration is run between 
MN and RA. We assume that, after being identified by RA, 
the Mobile Node Ai obtains the pair (z, ID), where z is the 
nonce generated by RA during setup, and ID identifies the 
nature of the readings for which Ai provides reports. 
Query Registration. The query registration is as follows: 
1. Query Authorization: Querier Q registers to RA to 
get an authorization to receive readings for a given 
query, identified by ID*. Q obtains: 
síg = H1(ID*)s. 
2. Query Subscription: Querier Q—subscribing to read-
ings identified by ID*—sends to the SP: 
T* =H2[e(R,sig)]. 
Data Report. Mobile node Ai periodically submits data 
reports to SP, using NO's infrastructure. In our protocol, 
2Recall that the map e is bilinear if e{Ua, Vb) = e{U, V)ab. 
to upload a reading, V, related to query ID, Ai sends SP 
(using NO's infrastructure) the pair (T,CT), such that: 
T = H2[e(Q,H1(ID)z)], CT = ENCk(V) 
for k = H3[e(Q,H1(ID)z)]. 
Query Execution. The query execution is as follows: 
1. Blind Hatching: The Service Provider matches T with 
stored T*'s and returns Q all matching T's, alongside 
associated CT's. 
2. Notif icat ion: On receiving (T, CT), Q computes k* = 
Hz[e(R,sig)] and obtains: 
V = Deck* {CT) 
Nonce renewal. We assume a dynamic set of subscribed 
MNs where new sensors can register and malicious ones are 
evicted. In order to ban misbehaving sensors, the RA peri-
odically generates and distributes a fresh z to sensors and 
R = Ps to queriers. The former can be securely distributed 
to honest sensors using broadcast encryption [2]. 
4.2 Privacy Analysis 
We now consider privacy properties of PEPSI. Due to 
space limitation, we only provide concise proofs at this stage 
and defer detailed proofs to [8]. We assume that the sys-
tem is immune to eavesdropping. In fact, 3G networks en-
crypt communication between mobile phones and the net-
work operator. Communication between other parties (i.e., 
RA í=; MN, Querier ±5 SP, etc.) are encrypted using 
standard techniques, e.g., using SSL. 
Soundness. Our PEPSI solution is sound, since: for any 
(ID*, sig) held by a querier Q, and ID held by a node Ai, 
if: (1) sig = Hi(ID*)s, where s is RA's secret key, and (2) 
ID* = ID, we obtain : 
T = H2[e(Q,H1(ID)z)] = H2[e(Pz,H1(ID*)s)] 
= H2[e(R,sig)]=T* 
and, similarly, also k = k*. Therefore, (1) SP correctly 
matches Q's (authorized) request T* with the appropriate 
sensor report (T, CT), and (2) Q can correctly decrypt CT 
and recover V. 
Node Privacy. Our PEPSI solution is node-private since 
only authorized queriers in possession of a valid sig can learn 
any information about the report (T,CT). Privacy w.r.t. 
the NO, the SP, other MNs and non-authorized queriers, 
stems from the security of the underlying Identity-based En-
cryption scheme [1]. The main intuition is that this kind of 
adversary could obtain information about a node's report 
only if she was in possession of the appropriate sig or— 
assuming that ID's have low entropy—the nonce z. Assum-
ing a CPA-secure and key-private IBE system, the resulting 
PEPSI scheme is trivially node-private w.r.t. the NO, the 
SP, and non-authorized queriers. We sketch a prove of this 
claim by contradiction. Assuming our claim is not true, 
then there exists a polynomial-bounded adversary A that 
violates node privacy of PEPSI. A is given ID and the IBE-
encryption of V under the key ID but not the corresponding 
sig = Hi(ID)s. If A decrypts V with non-negligible prob-
ability, then we can construct a polynomial-bounded adver-
sary B which uses A to break the CPA-security of IBE. This 
contradicts our assumption. 
Note that the RA could use its secret key to "test" an ar-
bitrary ID* against an eavesdropped report (T,CT). That 
is, the RA could learn whether ID* = ID and viólate node 
privacy. However, assuming that reports (T, CT) are super-
encrypted under SP's public key, the RA can access nodes' 
reports only if it coiludes with the SP. 
Query Privacy. PEPSI is query-private since neither the 
NO, the SP, other queriers, ñor any mobile node, learn any 
information about query interests of a querier Q. Query 
privacy stems from the security of the underlying Identity-
based Encryption scheme [1]. Arguments behind this claim 
mirror those outlined above for node privacy, thus, we do 
not repeat them here. 
Observe that the privacy of a querier Q, subscribed to ID* 
(i.e., in possession of sig = Hi(ID*)s), could be violated by 
a malicious party, subscribed to ID' (i.e., in possession of 
sig' = H^ID'Y), only if: (1) she obtains T = H2[e(R, sig)] 
sent from Q to the SP during Query Subscription and (2) 
ID* = ID'. Since the communication between Q and the 
SP is encrypted, (1) happens only if such a malicious party 
coiludes with the SP. 
Report Unlinkabüity and Location Privacy. As ar-
gued above, it is not possible to guarantee report unlinka-
büity with respect to the network operator. However, one 
could trust the NO to remove privacy-sensitive metadata 
from each report (such as mobile nodes' identifiers, the cell 
from which the report was originated, etc.), before forward-
ing it to the SP. Nonetheless, this would not require the 
NO to act as a Mix Network. Also, the NO never delays 
message forwarding, e.g., until "enough" reports to protect 
privacy are collected, but forwards "the payload" of each 
report (i.e., (T,CT)) as soon as it is received. 
Trust Assumptions. The security of PEPSI only relies 
on the assumption that the SP is not colluding with either 
the RA or queriers — on the contrary, prior work assumed 
the presence of severa! non-colluding and/or fully-trusted 
parties [6, 12, 9, 11]. Specifically, if the RA and the SP 
colluded, they could viólate node privacy using RA's secret 
key, s, and pairs (T, CT) received by the SP. Also, recall that 
any party registered as a querier could potentially coilude 
with the SP and try violating query privacy: it could test a 
given sig (obtained during the Query Authorization) against 
messages sent by the victim querier to the SP (during Query 
Subscription). We argüe that assuming a non-colluding SP 
is realistic since in participatory sensing, SPs often capitalize 
on the services they provide, thus, they have no incentive to 
deviate from an honest-but-curious behavior. 
Furthermore, PEPSI needs to trust the NO to remove sen-
sitive MN information from reports before forwarding to the 
SP. Recall that this assumption is essential since anonymity 
w.r.t the NO is not achievable in 3G networks. 
4.3 Performance Evaluation 
Even if resources in participatory sensing are not as con-
strained as in WSNs, we aim at minimizing the overhead 
incurred at mobile nodes. This section provides prelimi-
nary figures on the cost of cryptographic operations used to 
achieve intended privacy features. 
We implemented protocol operations executed by MNs 
on a Nokia N900 (equipped with a 600 MHz ARM proces-
sor and 256 MB RAM) running the l ibpbc cryptographic 
library [17]. We selected Type-A pairings and 160-bit prime 
q. Computation overhead is due to the computation of T, 
the encryption key k, and the encrypted report CT. Note 
t h a t the first two valúes can be computed off-line, inde-
pendent ly of the sensed da ta . Communica t ion overhead is 
merely due to the t ransmission of T , which is t he ou tpu t of a 
hash function (e.g., SHA-1), and can be as small as 160-bit. 
Indeed, using available symmetric-key cryptosystems (e.g., 
AES) , the length of CT is almost t he same as a reading V. 
Withou t leveraging off-line p recomputa t ion , we measured 
the t ime to compute and t ransmi t (T, CT), using integers as 
d a t a reports . Over 100 exper iments , we experienced an aver-
age t ime of 93.47ms to compute (T, CT) and around 80ms 
for t ransmission over the 3G network. Note t h a t a na'ive 
(non-private) solution would save in computa t ion (since d a t a 
would not be encrypted) bu t would spend roughly the same 
transmission t ime to send the report . Finally, r emark t h a t 
the SP incurs no communica t ion ñor computa t iona l over-
head: its task is l imited to hash comparison and forwarding. 
Similarly, the only addit ional operat ion t h a t queriers per-
form during query execution is the symmetr ic decrypt ion of 
received readings, which incurs a negligible overhead. 
5. CONCLUSIÓN 
T h e par t ic ipatory sensing pa rad igm bears an irrefutably 
great potent ia l . However, its success depends on the number 
of users willing to repor t measurements from their mobile de-
vices. Clearly, a wide-scale user par t ic ipat ion is bound to ef-
fective protocols t h a t preserve privacy of b o t h d a t a produc-
ers (i.e., mobile nodes) and d a t a consumers (i.e., queriers) . 
In this paper , we highlighted shortcomings of previous Solu-
t ions and we embarked towards a cryptographic t r ea tmen t 
of privacy in par t ic ipatory sensing. To this aim, we ana-
lyzed which are t he privacy features t h a t can be guaranteed 
wi th provable security and int roduced a par t ic ipa tory sens-
ing protocol t h a t a t t a ins them. Finally, we provided figures 
of the incurred overhead a t mobile nodes. 
As often happens , deploying ac tual solutions based on our 
proposal requires addressing addit ional (potential) security 
issues, such as authent icat ion, d a t a integrity, DoS preven-
tion, active a t tacks , Sybil a t tacks , etc. Our next s tep is to 
deploy test ing applicat ions using the P E P S I infrastructure, 
as well as to devise a large-scale evaluation of i ts global over-
head. Our future work also includes extending the proto-
cols to efficiently suppor t query privacy w.r.t . the RA (i.e., 
queriers can register wi thout the R A learning their inter-
ests). Interest ing open challenges remain in how to provide 
location privacy wi th respect to cellular network operator , 
addressing potent ia l collusion between different par t ies , and 
suppor t ing more complex queries (e.g., aggregate and con-
junct ive queries). 
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